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Abstract 
 
Labor markets are important, because most people, especially the poor, derive all or the 
great bulk of their income from the work they do. This paper approaches labor markets 
through models of segmented labor markets. 
 
The first main substantive section presents the essence of segmented labor market  
modeling, in particular, the role of labor market dualism. Given that labor markets often 
consist of quite distinct segments, a useful and insightful analytical approach is to start 
with just two interrelated segments, which here are termed formal and informal. 
Accordingly, the next sections present models of wages and employment in the formal 
sector, the informal sector, and the linkages between the two respectively. The final 
substantive section shows the contributions that these models make to understanding and 
policy analysis in labor markets. 
 
It would not be expected that the same model would fit East Africa and East Asia or 
South Africa and South Korea. Surely, the “correct” model is context-specific. Blending 
empirical observation and analytical modeling has yielded great advances. Sound labor 
market policies require sound labor market models.
                                                 
*  I am grateful to Mabel Andalón, Gordon Betcherman, Shanta Devarajan, Lisa Dragoset, Louise Fox, 
Robert Duval Hernández, Maria Laura Sánchez Puerta, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments 
on an earlier draft. 
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This is a paper on labor market models. The aim is to construct models that are as 
simple as they can be but as complicated as they need to be. Such models, if carefully 
done, can contribute to an understanding of observed labor market phenomena and to the 
formulation of sound labor market policies.  
Some branches of economics work with models that assume that everybody who 
works participates in a single, undifferentiated labor market. I regard such models as 
grossly unrealistic. A better description, I would maintain, is that jobs differ in quality, 
these different groups being called “segments” or “sectors”. Thus, labor market 
segmentation is said to exist if 1) Jobs for individuals of a given skill level differ in terms 
of their pay or other characteristics, and 2) Access to the more attractive jobs is limited in 
that not all who want the better jobs can get them.  
The notion of labor market segmentation can be stylized most simply by 
maintaining that there are two labor market segments. A realistic assumption is that all 
who participate in the labor market want the better jobs, but good jobs are available only 
for a fraction of the labor force. Those who do not get the good jobs must either take up a 
bad job or remain unemployed. Models with two labor market segments prove to be both 
tractable and insightful, and so are used here. 
In this paper, labor markets should be thought of as consisting not only of wage 
and salaried employment but also self-employment. All who work or seek to work in 
labor markets are termed “workers.” 
Why are labor markets important to economic development? Many individuals 
and institutions, including the World Bank and the regional development banks, seek “a 
world free of poverty.” Broadly speaking, those who are poor are poor because 1) they 
earn little from the work they do, if indeed they have work at all, 2) the societies in which 
they live are too poor to provide them with substantial goods and services by virtue of 
their citizenship or residency, and 3) the poor are not permitted to move to richer 
countries. Thus, anti-poverty efforts can be focused on 1) helping people as workers by 
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creating more and better-paying employment,, 2) helping people as citizens/residents 
through publicly-provided goods and services, and 3) striving for freer movement of 
labor from poor to rich countries. This paper is concerned with the first channel: helping 
improve labor market opportunities for workers. 
 The importance of labor markets for anti-poverty efforts is underscored by 
research studies using decomposition methodologies. These studies have shown that 
labor income inequality is as important or more important than all other income sources 
combined in explaining total income inequality; see Ayub (1977) for Pakistan, Fields 
(1979a) for Colombia, and Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1978, 1979) and Fields and Mitchell 
(1999) for Taiwan. The reason that labor income is so important is, in the words of the 
1990 World Development Report, that “the poor’s most abundant asset [is their] labor.” 
(World Bank, 1990, p. 3). It follows that a very important factor in explaining family 
income inequality is that some people earn very large amounts for their labor while a 
great many earn very little. Thus, it is the inequality of labor incomes that accounts 
primarily for the inequality of total incomes. 
Labor income also plays a predominant role in income mobility research. In much 
of this literature, economic welfare is gauged by household per capita income (PCI) or 
household per capita consumption (PCC). Research on changing PCI in Indonesia, South 
Africa, Spain, and Venezuela has shown that household per-capita income changes are 
determined much more by changes in household income (the numerator) than by changes 
in number of household members (the denominator) and that changes in labor income far 
outweigh changes in other sorts of income (Fields et al., 2003). 
 This paper approaches labor markets through segmented labor market modeling. 
Such models start with the recognition that in many countries, the labor market consists 
of quite distinct segments that are linked with one another. When there are just two 
segments, these models are called “dualistic” labor market models. 
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 As explained below, segmented labor market models are valuable because they 
can explain a number of phenomena that simply do not make sense in a single market 
setting. To develop a framework/typology and lay out the main issues in segmented labor 
market modeling, the paper proceeds in five stages.  
The first main substantive section (Section I) presents the essence of labor market 
dualism. I maintain that labor markets often consist of quite distinct segments and that a 
useful and insightful analytical approach is to start with just two.  
The second main substantive section is on models of wages and employment in 
the formal economy. To be reviewed here are 1) the market-clearing labor market model 
and the presumed equilibrating forces, 2) above-market-clearing wages set institutionally, 
3) above-market-clearing wages set by efficiency wage considerations, and 4) above-
market-clearing wages set by worker behavior. 
 The third main substantive section is on wages and employment in the informal 
economy. This section presents three characterizations of informal sector labor markets: 
1) the informal economy as a free-entry sector that prospective workers enter only as a 
last resort, 2) the informal economy as a desirable sector that workers choose in 
preference to formal sector work, and 3) the informal economy with its own internal 
dualism, combining 1) and 2). 
 The fourth main substantive section is on formal-informal linkages. The models 
here are: 1) the integrated labor market model with full market clearing, 2) crowding 
models, and 3) the Harris-Todaro model. 
 Finally, the fifth main substantive section discusses five contributions that these 
models make to understanding and policy analysis. These issues are 1) why an increase in 
productivity might cause wages to fall, 2) why Taiwan’s economic growth led first to 
falling unemployment at constant wages and then to economy-wide wage increases at full 
employment, 3) why the solution to urban unemployment in Kenya was not urban 
employment creation but rural development, 4) why poverty is so severe in the urban 
 4
informal sector of many developing countries, and 5) why expanding formal sector 
employment sometimes improves labor market conditions and sometimes does not. 
While the models presented here differ from one another in important respects, 
they all share certain common features of which the reader should be aware from the 
outset. First, firms in these models are assumed to be maximizing profits. This means that 
they hire workers, raise wages, and improve worker quality if and only if it is in their 
profit-maximizing interest to do so. Second, workers in these models are assumed to be 
maximizing utility. Especially in poor countries, in which large numbers of people value 
additional goods greatly compared to leisure, the utility-maximization assumption may 
often be fruitfully replaced by an income-maximization assumption. Third, the notion of 
“market equilibrium” used in this paper needs to be clarified. “Market equilibrium” is a 
state toward which a market tends and, once there, it tends to stay. “Market-clearing” is a 
state in which the quantity of a good or service supplied equals the quantity demanded. 
Some of the equilibria we shall deal with in this paper are market-clearing and others are 
not. And finally, the objective of this paper is to make labor outcomes more 
understandable; much of what is understandable is not pretty.  
  
I. The Essence of Labor Market Dualism 
 At the core of segmented labor market modeling is the distinction between one 
part of the labor market and another. In the literature, one sector is alternatively called 
“formal,” “modern,” “industrial,” “good jobs,” or “urban”, while the other is alternatively 
called “informal,” “traditional,” “agricultural,” “bad jobs,” or “rural.” (At one point, I 
even called this latter one the “murky” sector.)  Throughout this paper, the 
formal/informal terminology shall be used.  
Labor market dualism is a useful stylization of what has been called “labor market 
segmentation” or “labor market fragmentation.” Dixit (1973) explained why:  
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The dual economy has, over the last decade, proved itself to be a useful 
conceptual framework for analyzing several problems of economic 
development. . . Dual economy models provide a significantly better 
description and understanding of the problems of development than any 
aggregate model . . . because the sectoral division chosen reflects several 
vital social and economic distinctions in the type of economy being 
analyzed. 
Why have just two sectors? Basu (1997, p.152) put it thus:  
 
The assumption of duality is merely for analytical convenience. If 
fragmentation – irrespective of the number of parts – in itself causes some 
problems and we wish to examine these, then the simplest assumption to 
make is that of dualism. 
Unfortunately, international practice has been quite ambiguous about the feature 
distinguishing the two sectors. The International Labour Organisation and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean have defined the informal sector as the 
sum of non-professional self-employed, domestic workers, unpaid workers, and workers 
in enterprises employing five or fewer workers. In Brazil, the formal sector consists of 
workers who hold labor cards entitling them to various benefits and protections and the 
informal sector of those who do not.  In other contexts, the formal sector is distinguished 
according to whether the firm is registered with the government and pays taxes. Yet 
others equate the informal economy with drugs, prostitution, and other illegal activities. 
For alternative definitions and operationalizations, see ILO (2002) and Jhabvala, 
Sudarshan, and Unni (2003). 
The distinguishing feature used by Nobel laureates Arthur Lewis (1954) and 
Simon Kuznets (1955) as well as other dual economy modelers is the fact that workers 
earn different wages depending on the sector of the economy in which they are able to 
find work. Lewis wrote (p. 150): “Earnings in the subsistence sector set a floor to wages 
in the capitalist sector, but in practice wages have to be higher than this, and there is 
usually a gap of 30 per cent or more between capitalist wages and subsistence earnings.” 
Lewis explained that although part of the gap is “illusory” because of the higher cost of 
living in the capitalist sector, there remained a real wage gap due to a) the “psychological 
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cost of transferring from the easy going way of life of the subsistence sector to the more 
regimented and urbanized environment of the capitalist sector,” b) the payoff to 
experience in the capitalist sector, and c) “workers in the capitalist sector acquiring tastes 
and a social prestige which have conventionally to be recognized by higher real wages.” 
Kuznets (1955) further developed the model of wage dualism and intersectoral 
shifts by exploring how various measures of income inequality (including the income 
share of the lowest income quintile, the income share of the richest income quintile, and 
the range) would change as the high-income sector comes to employ an increasing share 
of the population. All of the inequality measures used by Kuznets (the income share of 
the poorest quintile, the income share of the richest quintile, and the interquintile range) 
exhibited an inverted-U pattern, which later came to be known as the “Kuznets Curve.” 
Subsequent research examined inequality further (Knight, 1976; Robinson, 1976; Fields, 
1979a; Anand and Kanbur, 1993) and also examined poverty (Fields, 1979a ; Anand and 
Kanbur, 1985) in the Lewis-Kuznets process of intersectoral shifts. 
 Later writings on labor market dualism were grounded in human capital theory as 
developed by Schultz (1961, 1962), Becker (1962, 1964), and Mincer (1962, 1974). This 
later literature on labor market dualism stressed that for dualism to exist, different wages 
must be paid in different sectors to comparable workers. Subsequently, many researchers 
reported empirical evidence showing such dualism or segmentation for observationally 
equivalent workers.  
 The idea that different wages are paid to comparable workers has been 
incorporated, largely without question, into job search theory. Since the late 1960’s and 
early 1970’s, a whole class of models has arisen in which a wide variety of wages exist in 
the labor market, and workers are presumed to search among employers for the best 
possible opportunities. See, for instance, the textbook treatments of job search in 
Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) and also the work on 
equilibrium wage distributions by Stiglitz (1985) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998).  
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 Dualistic labor market models have been criticized on a number of grounds. One 
critique is that offered by Rosenzweig (1988). Noting that empirical studies often show 
that workers with given measured human capital characteristics have systematically 
different wages or earnings depending on the type of employment in which they are 
working, he asked (p. 756): “Do [these differentials] suggest barriers to mobility – non-
competing groups – or do they merely reflect compensatory differentials, rewards for 
unmeasured skills or compensation for unmeasured differences in the disutility of the 
workplace?” Favoring the latter set of explanations, Rosenzweig found the dualistic labor 
market literature unconvincing.  
 Dualistic labor market models, and segmented labor market models more 
generally, have been criticized on other grounds as well. An Inter-American 
Development Bank report (IADB, 2003) put it thus: “According to [the dualistic view of 
the labor market], the formal and informal economies operated in segmented labor 
markets and there is limited mobility between the two. Nothing could be further from the 
truth . . . In a given six-month period, about 16 percent of workers in Mexico and 11 
percent of workers in Argentina move either in or out of an informal job.” Nonetheless, 
the fact is that most workers remain in the sector in which they began.  
 These critiques notwithstanding, it appears to me that luck plays an important role 
in the sense that the very same individual with his or her own measured and unmeasured 
skills will do better or worse in the labor market over the long run if a job vacancy exists 
in a more attractive labor market sector than if such a vacancy does not exist. Thus, labor 
markets are better characterized as being segmented in the sense of cumulative advantage 
and low-level traps (Nelson, 1966; Merton, 1968; Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Boudon, 
1973; Meade, 1976) than as being unified in the sense that the next-best employer is 
essentially indistinguishable from the current one. 
To conclude this section, in most settings, I find that it is more useful to think of 
developing countries’ labor markets as being fragmented or segmented than to think of 
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all workers and firms in a country participating in one single labor market. When 
possible, Occam’s Razor suggests limiting the analysis to two sectors. Labor market 
dualism was a most useful starting point for analyzing some economies when it was first 
presented decades ago, and it remains a useful characterization of some economies today. 
But when two sectors are simply not enough, three-sector or n-sector models can prove 
insightful, a point to be developed further in the sequel.  
We turn now to the formal sector labor market, the informal sector labor market, 
and the interactions between them. 
 
II. The Formal Sector Labor Market 
 This section presents four alternative models of wages and employment in the 
formal sector: the market-clearing labor market model, models with wages set above 
market-clearing levels for institutional reasons, models with wages set above market-
clearing levels for efficiency wage reasons, and models with wages set above market-
clearing levels because of supply-side considerations. 
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A.  The Market-Clearing Labor Market Model 
 The market-clearing labor market model is so well-known that it can be presented 
quite concisely. Figure 1 displays the three essential features. First, the amount of labor 
demanded is taken as a decreasing function of the wage, other things equal. The market 
labor demand curve slopes downward because of diminishing marginal revenue product 
of labor and the associated substitution and scale effects of a wage change. Second, the 
amount of labor supplied is taken as an increasing function of the wage, other things 
equal.  The market labor supply curve slopes upward because a higher wage induces 
workers to enter this labor market from other labor markets and induces non-workers to 
enter the labor force. And third, the wage is set by supply and demand in order to clear 
the market. 
 According to the market-clearing model, three equilibrating forces operate: 
behavior of firms, behavior of workers, and behavior of wages. In the model, firms are 
free to hire workers or not depending on what is in their profit-maximizing interest to do. 
If market conditions change, what is in their profit-maximizing interest to do will change 
accordingly, and firms are free to act on these changes. Similarly, workers are free to 
supply their labor in any given labor market or not depending on what is in their utility-
maximizing interest to do. For them too, if market conditions change, what is in their 
utility-maximizing interest to do will change accordingly, and they (workers) are free to 
act on these changes. And finally, if supply and/or demand conditions change, real wages 
are free to rise or fall accordingly. (In this paper, wages should always be thought of in 
real terms.) 
 Let us now consider three groups of models with different causal structures and 
different market outcomes. 
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B. Above-Market-Clearing Wages Set Institutionally 
An important class of models in the labor market literature holds that wages in the 
formal sector are set by a set of forces different from supply and demand. In the models 
reviewed in this section, the defining feature is heavy reliance on “institutional” forces. 
(“Institutional” forces are those other than the profit-maximizing behavior of firms and 
the utility-maximizing behavior of workers.) 
It is useful to distinguish five institutional features that may be important in 
different settings (e.g., Fields and Wan, 1989; Fields, 1999). They are: minimum wages; 
trade unions; public sector pay policies; multinational corporations; and labor codes.  
 Minimum wages aim to assure workers an "adequate" standard of living.  
Minimum wages have long been on the books throughout most of the developing world 
(Starr, 1981; World Bank, 1995; Inter-American Development Bank, 2003), but their 
effects differ. In some countries, such as Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, and India, minimum 
wages are said to be binding and enforced (World Bank, 1995, p. 75).  But in others, 
minimum wage laws make little difference. South Korea introduced a minimum wage 
system only in 1988, and the minimum wage levels have been set so that they prove to be 
a binding constraint for only about 2% of Korean workers (Park, 1991; Lee, 2002).  In 
the case of Taiwan, although a minimum wage law has been in force for decades, no 
company has ever been fined for violating the law (Chang, 1989). 
 Trade unions are often encouraged by government policy as a means of entitling 
workers to a "just" share of the fruits of their labor.  One early theory of trade union 
behavior is that unions have a variety of objectives, including both higher wages and 
greater union membership (Dunlop, 1944). More recent approaches have stressed that 
those already employed in unions (the “insiders”) may be more concerned about raising 
their wages than about increasing membership (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Lindbeck 
and Snower, 1988). Indeed, unions have raised the wages of their members by as much as 
150% in Jamaica, 31% in Ghana, 24% in South Africa, and 20% in Malaysia (Tidrick, 
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1975; World Bank, 1995, Table 12.2; Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002). By contrast, in South 
Korea and Taiwan, unions have been repressed and the union wage premium is at most 
two to three percent. (Lin, 1989; Park, 1991; Yoo, 1995). 
 Public sector pay policies often result in substantially higher wages being paid to 
government workers than to their private sector counterparts.  Costa Rica is an example 
of this, and as a result, "everybody" there tries to work for the government (Gindling, 
1991).  In East Asia, the public sector pays what it has to in order to compete with the 
private sector -- neither more nor less. 
 Multinational corporations frequently pay above-market wages in sub-Saharan 
Africa and elsewhere (Squire, 1981).  Wage levels and working conditions tend to be 
higher in export-oriented firms than in firms producing for the domestic market (ILO, 
1998; Moran, 2002; Ghose, 2003). Although export-oriented multinationals offer higher 
wages and better working conditions partly for efficiency wage reasons (see subsection C 
below), they also do this because some governments have "encouraged" them to do so by 
not so subtly threatening expulsion or expropriation if they do not (Eaton and Gersovitz, 
1984).   
Finally, labor codes in some countries regulate hiring and firing, impose payroll 
taxes on firms, and mandate that employers provide certain benefits to their workers.  
Panama had such a labor code, and it was estimated to have raised labor costs by 90% 
(Spinanger, 1985) before it was finally abandoned as unsustainable.  Likewise, Bolivian 
employment legislation raises labor costs by an estimated 90-110% (Bravo, 1995).  
Larger firms in India and Zimbabwe are not permitted to dismiss workers; employment 
levels and economic efficiency have been found to be artificially low as a result (Fallon 
and Lucas, 1991, 1993; Besley and Burgess, 2004).   
Higher-than-market-clearing wages for institutional reasons in the formal sector 
are at the core of many economic models. They include the Keynesian macroeconomic 
model, Lewis’s classical development model, Harris and Todaro’s dualistic labor market 
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model, and many others. Virtually without exception, economic models regard formal 
sector employment as being determined in a very neoclassical way: given the wage and 
the capital stock, employment is set according to the marginal revenue product of labor.  
 Ample research has shown that labor demand elasticities are significantly 
negative; Hamermesh (1993) provides a comprehensive review of the empirical 
literature.  In South Africa, for example, various researchers have produced estimates of 
the wage elasticity of employment in that country’s formal sector (Bowles and Heintz, 
1996; Fields, Leibbrandt, and Wakeford, 2000). Most estimates range from -0.5 to -0.7. 
While these studies differ in terms of their precise estimates, what they agree on is that 1) 
the wage elasticity of employment is significantly negative and 2) the wage elasticity of 
employment is significantly less than one in absolute value.  
Given significantly negative labor demand elasticities, higher-than-market-
clearing wages would be expected to reduce formal sector employment below what it 
would have been otherwise. Unemployment will result in the economy unless all of the 
workers not employed in the formal sector take up employment in the informal sector. 
Whether they do or not is the subject of Section IV.  
Given these research findings, the five labor market interventions reviewed above 
need to be considered carefully. Their aims are laudatory - to raise earnings and reduce 
poverty - and they do indeed benefit the workers who are fortunate enough to work in 
covered sectors of the economy.  However, they appear to have had adverse employment 
and efficiency effects and to have contributed to the informalization of the economy, as 
employers evade the regulations by not engaging workers as regular employees or by not 
even appearing as official companies  (DeSoto, 1989; Turnham, 1993; Maloney, 2003; 
Levy, 2008).  Helping formal sector workers may or may not be the best tool for fighting 
poverty in any given context. 
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C.  Above-Market-Clearing Wages Set by Efficiency Wage Considerations 
An old and well-established idea that commands nearly universal agreement not 
only in economics but in human resource management is that a firm can raise its labor 
productivity by paying a higher wage. Credit is usually given to Leibenstein (1957) for 
originating this idea in the economics literature. See also Stiglitz (1974, 1976), Mirrlees 
(1975), Bliss and Stern (1978), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Akerlof and Yellen (1986), 
Dasgupta and Ray (1986), and Weiss (1990) for further developments. But it goes back 
much further than that to Henry Ford, who pioneered the radical practice a century ago of 
offering his workers $5 a day, which was twice the going wage at that time (Raff and 
Summers, 1987).  
Efficiency wage theory incorporates the proposition that higher wages can result 
in higher productivity but goes beyond it in a fundamentally important way. According to 
the core microeconomic model of firms, firms are trying to achieve higher profits, which 
may or may not be enhanced by higher productivity.  Thus, the basic postulate of 
efficiency wage theory is that profit-maximizing firms will pay higher-than-market-
clearing wages if and only if the gains in productivity from doing so outweigh the costs, 
so that profits are increased. In other words, it is not enough simply to maintain that 
paying a higher wage generates benefits. It must be that the benefits exceed the costs. 
Much that is written about “high road” labor relations practices ignores this fundamental 
truth; see, for example, Ulrich (1997) and Noe et al. (2000). 
Efficiency wage theory has also contributed usefully to analyzing the mechanisms 
by which productivity gains are realized. These fall into two major categories.  
One set of explanations is that higher wages enable firms to hire better-quality 
workers from a heterogeneous labor pool. They may, for example, hire workers who have 
more education and who for this reason are expected to be more productive. 
Alternatively, they may administer tests of potential job performance and hire those 
workers who perform the best on these tests. 
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The other set of explanations is that higher wages induce workers of a given skill 
level to perform in a more productive manner. The mechanisms analyzed here include 
better nutrition, improved morale, reduced shirking, lower labor turnover, reduced 
absenteeism, and greater discretionary effort. 
Where the efficiency wage models come out, then, is that wages remain above the 
market-clearing level because firms in the labor market find it in their profit-maximizing 
interest to keep wages above the market-clearing level. Put differently, a firm that is 
paying efficiency wages would hurt its profits if it lowered wages.  
As in the models reviewed in the last subsection, when wages are higher-than-
market-clearing for efficiency wage reasons, we also have unemployment as an 
equilibrium outcome. However, the unemployment that arises here occurs for a very 
different reason from the institutional wage case. In the efficiency wage models, it is 
firms that do not want to reduce wages, even though at least some of the unemployed 
would be willing to work for lower wages rather than remain jobless. This contrasts with 
the institutional wage case, in which it is employed workers who want the wage to remain 
where it is. 
 
D. Above-Market-Clearing Wages Set on the Supply Side 
Another explanation for wages remaining above the market-clearing level has 
been suggested and modeled by Bardhan and Rudra (1981), Drèze and Mukherjee (1989), 
Solow (1990), and Osmani (1991). Suppose that daily wages in a labor market start out 
initially above the market-clearing level for some reason – for example, because the wage 
was set in the peak season and the economy is now in the slack season. According to the 
standard account of equilibrating forces in labor markets, when the wage is higher than 
the market-clearing level, unemployed workers would offer to work for lower wages 
rather than remain unemployed.  
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However, in the models of Bardhan and Rudra, Drèze and Mukherjee, Solow, and 
Osmani, workers’ supply side behavior may differ from the standard account, as follows. 
Suppose that the labor market is a casual one in which hiring takes place afresh each day. 
If the demand for labor is inelastic, the total wage bill paid to labor over a longer period 
such as a month or a year will be higher the higher is the daily wage.  Each of the 
unemployed knows that he or she will earn more on average over the course of many 
days if s/he does not undercut the established wage and therefore will not do so. Wages 
remain above the market-clearing level as a result. 
 In this class of models, unlike the models in the earlier subsections, wages are 
kept above the market-clearing level by the behavior of the unemployed. In this way, the 
wage remains above the market-clearing level, and unemployment persists as a result. 
 
 
III. The Informal Sector Labor Market  
The crucial feature of labor market dualism described above is that the formal 
sector offers relatively attractive wages and other terms and conditions of employment 
while the informal sector offers relatively unattractive ones. This leads to the first 
characterization of the informal economy: workers prefer formal sector jobs and enter the 
informal sector only as a last resort. More recently, though, a different view has been put 
forth: that the informal economy is a desirable sector that workers choose in preference to 
formal sector work. A third view is that the informal economy has its own internal 
dualism, combining these two characterizations. A current resource on the informal 
economy is the ILO’s Informal Economy Resource Database, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/dwresources/iebrowse.home?p_lang=en . 
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 A. The Informal Economy as a Free-Entry Sector of Last Resort 
Most of the poor in the world are working poor. New ILO data show that while 
open unemployment throughout the world is 6.2% of the labor force, another 42.5% of 
those in the labor force are working but earning less than US$ 2 per day (ILO, 2005). It 
has long been recognized that open unemployment is the tip of the proverbial iceberg: the 
greater part of the employment problem in developing countries consists of workers who 
earn so little when they work that they and their families are poor (e.g., Turnham,1971; 
Squire, 1981). The working poor are found disproportionately in the informal sector. 
Ample empirical research has shown that labor earnings in the informal sector are 
low, lower even than in the formal sector in a large number of countries. For example, 
Sudarshan and Unni (2003) see informal work as “a survival activity of the very poor,” 
noting that the dimensions of informal activity are large: 35-85 percent of non-
agricultural employment in Asia, 40-97 percent in Africa, and 30-75 percent in the Latin 
America-Caribbean region.. 
In the cities of developing countries, we see large numbers of people 
engaged in work that earns them some cash each day or week. These include 
hoards of shoe shiners clustered in the town square, lottery ticket vendors 
seemingly every few feet, would-be construction workers clustered at a particular 
street corner awaiting the daily round-up, newspaper vendors approaching 
stopped cars at virtually every traffic light, and (sadly) groups of women, and 
sometimes men and children, gathered in the red light district. Lewis (1954, p. 
141) referred to “the whole range of casual jobs – the workers on the docks, the 
young men who rush forward asking to carry your bag as you appear, the jobbing 
gardener, and the like. These occupations usually have a multiple of the number 
they need, each of them earning very small sums from occasional employment; 
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frequently their number could be halved without reducing output in this sector.” 
(Emphasis added) 
Subsequent investigations into these people’s lives as well as casual empiricism 
led analysts to view these types of jobs as having free entry. In a pathbreaking ILO report 
on Kenya (1972, p. 6), the criteria defining the informal sector were:  
i) ease of entry; 
ii) reliance on indigenous resources; 
iii) family ownership of enterprises;  
iv) small scale of operation;  
v) labour-intensive and adapted technology; 
vi) skills acquired outside the formal school system; and 
vii) unregulated and competitive markets. 
The essence of free entry is that all who want a job can get one. (“Job” here is 
defined to include both self-employment and wage employment.) Barriers to entry into 
such occupations are small or non-existent. In some contexts, primarily urban, all that 
would-be workers need to do is make a minimal investment in the product or service to 
be sold. In rural contexts, it is obligatory for the family or community to take back into 
the home those who find such work the best of a bad set of alternatives. One is reminded 
of Robert Frost’s immortal words in his poem “Death of the Hired Man”:  “Home is the 
place where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in.”  
The existence of free-entry employment opportunities in the informal sector helps 
explain why open unemployment rates in developing countries are comparable to those in 
developed countries, and often considerably lower (Turnham, 1971, 1993; World Bank, 
1995; ILO, 2003). The standard ILO definition of unemployment is a person who did no 
work for pay in the preceding week, not even for one hour. In poor countries lacking 
systems of unemployment insurance and cash assistance allowances, the great majority of 
poor people cannot afford to be without income for as long as a week. So to the extent 
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that the poor can quickly find an opportunity to earn some cash in an informal job, they 
take it. Open unemployment in their economies is low as a result.  
Because of easy entry into economic activities of such kinds, a different wage 
determination process from the standard marginal productivity rule must be found. Lewis 
posited income-sharing, a feature taken up by others (e.g., Fei and Ranis, 1964; 
Harberger, 1971; Fields, 1975). As viewed today, what matters, writes Ranis (2006), is 
“that the marginal product is low, and sufficiently low to fall below the bargaining wage 
or income share.” 
 How, then, would we now want to model informal sector wage determination? 
Essentially, there are four tacks that might be taken, the first two for analytical simplicity 
and the second two for greater comprehensiveness.  
One is to assume that there is a fixed amount of income to be earned in the 
informal sector regardless of the number of people working in that sector - that is, the 
marginal product of labor is literally zero.  For example, there may be a fixed number of 
newspapers to be sold regardless of the number of newspaper vendors. How is the fixed 
income from newspaper vending to be divided? The easiest simplifying assumption here 
is full income-sharing among the informally employed, so that each earns the average 
product. The average product is not constant, though – it varies inversely with the number 
of people in the informal sector. This was the way the urban informal wage was modeled 
in Fields (1975, 1989). 
 A second approach is to regard a part of the informal sector as facing, instead of 
zero marginal product, constant marginal product. The dual economy model developed 
by Harris and Todaro (1970) was formulated to fit the East African case, which they and 
others regarded as a land surplus economy at the time. Harris and Todaro assumed that 
anyone who wanted to work in agriculture could find a plot of land, cultivate it, and earn 
the marginal product from his or her efforts. Agricultural wages were equated to marginal 
product, not average product as in Lewis. If the marginal worker and the marginal land 
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are assumed to be as productive as preceding inputs were, a convenient simplifying 
assumption would be to regard the marginal product of labor in agriculture as constant. 
This assumption was adopted by many in what has come to be called the simplified 
Harris-Todaro model (Fields, 1975; Anand and Joshi, 1979; Heady, 1981; Stiglitz, 1982; 
Sah and Stiglitz, 1985; Bell, 1991). 
 A third approach is intermediate between the first two: a positive but diminishing 
marginal product. Harberger (1971) put it thus: 
 
[This] variant associates disguised unemployment not just with low wages 
but with situations in which the marginal productivity of labour lies below 
the actual wages earned. . . There are a variety of activities to which this 
argument applies. A classic example is that of fishermen on a lake. The 
addition of more fishermen increases the total catch, but not 
proportionately, yet the last fisherman has an equal chance of making a 
given catch as the first. The expected catch is the same for all, and is equal 
to their average productivity. But, owing to the fact that the total catch 
does not increase in proportion to the number of fishermen, the marginal 
productivity of a fisherman is less than what he earns. 
Models with positive but variable marginal product are harder to work with than either of 
the two preceding ones. 
A fourth approach is to model a full demand system for agricultural and non-
agricultural products and workers. This was done by Bourguignon (1990). The equations 
of such systems are so complicated that they are best left to microsimulation and 
computable general equilibrium exercises. 
To conclude, the most common characterization of the informal sector is that it is 
an easy-entry sector that workers can enter to earn some cash in preference to earning 
nothing. An alternative view has been gaining popularity in recent years. Let us now turn 
to it. 
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B. The Informal Economy as a Desirable Sector 
A very different view of the informal sector also appears in the literature. It is the 
idea that a large number of those working in the informal sector are there voluntarily. 
This view has a long history in the literature (e.g., Hart, 1973; Balán, Browning, and 
Jelin, 1973). Fields (1990, p. 66) put it thus:  
 
Many people are in informal activities by choice. When asked their 
reasons for doing what they were doing, many informal workers in Costa 
Rica gave the following answers most frequently: i) They feel they could 
make more money at the informal sector job they were doing than they 
could earn in the formal sector, or ii) Even though they made a little less 
money, they enjoyed their work more, because it allowed them to choose 
their own hours, to work in the open air, to talk to friends, etc.  
The choice approach to the informal sector has been developed more recently in a 
series of papers by William Maloney. A comprehensive summary of these arguments 
appears in Maloney (2003).  
According to economics textbooks, workers choose among jobs and sectors on the 
basis of a package of characteristics. These include wages, benefits, the work 
environment, and so on. The variable denoted W on the vertical axis of a standard labor 
market diagram is ordinarily thought of as a shorthand for this package of benefits, and it 
is this package of characteristics which Maloney maintains are “roughly comparable” 
between informal self-employment and formal employment, at least in Mexico. 
Specifically, Maloney offers a number of reasons why workers might want to be in the 
informal sector: some can earn more (or at least hope to earn more) in informal self-
employment than they could earn in formal sector employment; they value the 
independence of self-employment; they would rather use the money that formal sector 
protections cost them for investing in their own small informal enterprises; they do not 
value protections such as health insurance which formal employment offers to them, in 
some cases because they already have these protections; and they don’t trust the 
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government to deliver on promises such as future pension benefits. For any or all of these 
reasons, there may be a sizeable numbers of workers who prefer informal self-
employment to formal wage employment. 
One reason that self-employment is often seen as undesirable is that 
microenterprises exhibit very high rates of failure. Maloney responds to the 
precariousness argument thus (2003, p. 77): 
 
Small firms will have higher costs, are likely to be informal, and will have 
very high failure rates. Though this corresponds exactly to the standard 
picture of the stagnant, precarious, unproductive, unprotected informal 
worker familiar in the literature, it is, in fact, the opposite. It emerges 
naturally from the workers trying their luck at entrepreneurship (risk-
taking), often failing, and not engaging in the formal institutions until they 
grow. In sum, there may be nothing pathological about informal self-
employment, and to recover the general sense of the word, nothing 
obviously less decent either. 
I agree with Maloney on this point, but I think he goes too far in one respect. He 
presents an integrated labor market model (pp. 68, 72) in which the total package of 
benefits is equalized between informal self-employment and formal wage employment.  
While this model might fit the choice between formal sector employment and informal 
self-employment for those who already have the option of working in the formal sector, 
this is a limited group of people. Rather, as argued above, throughout the developing 
world, formal sector jobs appear to be far fewer in number than the number of people 
who want them. Thus, in my view, Maloney’s characterization applies to a subset of 
informal sector workers, but by no means all of them, nor probably even most. 
  
C. The Informal Economy with Its Own Internal Dualism 
The preceding subsections put forward two polar views. One is that informal 
sector employment is worse than formal sector employment but superior to 
unemployment. The other is that employment in the informal economy is preferred to 
formal sector employment. 
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A way of combining these two polar views would be to regard the informal sector 
as having its own internal duality. On this synthesized approach, some informal activities 
are preferable to formal sector jobs and some are not. Such a view is developed at length 
in Fields (1990), where the two parts of the informal sector are labeled “upper-tier” 
informal activities and “easy entry” ones. See also House (1984), Tokman (1987), 
Marcouiller et al. (1997), and Ranis and Stewart (1999).  
In fact, dualism within the informal sector is a view that Maloney has come to 
share. Summarizing the findings of Cunningham and Maloney (2001) for Mexico, 
Maloney writes (2003, p. 80): “The single distribution was rejected, supporting a two-tier 
view, but the share of the population found in the ‘lower’ tier was only 13 percent of the 
sample.” Perhaps most informal entrepreneurs are in the upper-tier in Mexico, but it 
remains an open question whether this is the case in India, Bolivia, or Kenya. 
Another way of modeling the duality of the informal sector is to specify two 
informal sectors that are geographically distinct. Todaro (1969) had three employment 
sectors – urban modern employment, urban traditional employment, and agricultural 
employment – but no unemployment. Harris and Todaro (1970) had urban modern 
employment, agricultural employment, and unemployment but no urban informal sector. 
Fields (1975) had three employment states – urban modern employment, an urban 
informal sector, and rural agricultural employment – plus unemployment.  
If these various sector distinctions are put together, we should have four 
employment states - employment in the formal sector, employment in the upper-tier 
informal sector, employment in the easy-entry sector, and employment in rural 
agriculture – plus unemployment. Adding in rural off-farm employment – what is 
sometimes called the z-goods sector (Hymer and Resnick, 1969; Ranis and Stewart, 
1993) – would introduce a fifth employment state. To the best of my knowledge, no 
analytical model has included all five employment states plus unemployment, perhaps 
because to do so would be too complicated and intractable.  
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Although six-state models have not been constructed, the literature offers a 
number of four-state models (consisting of three employment sectors plus 
unemployment). How the different states link to one another is open to alternative 
specifications. These are discussed in Section V.  
 
IV.  Formal-Informal Linkages in the Labor Market 
 Based on the models of formal sector labor markets and informal sector labor 
markets reviewed in Sections II and III, this section reviews models of linkages between 
the various sectors. The models reviewed here are: 1) the integrated labor market model 
with full market clearing, 2) models with wage dualism but no unemployment, and 3) the 
Harris-Todaro model, both in its original form and as extended, which features both wage 
dualism and unemployment. 
 
A. The Integrated Labor Market Model with Wage Equalization and No 
Unemployment 
The integrated labor market model, also called the unified labor market model, 
has as its distinguishing features that 1) each labor market clears, and 2) full intermarket 
equilibrium is achieved through actual wage equalization. The model may be explained 
with the aid of Figure 2. 
Suppose for ease of analysis that the economy has two sectors, here termed 
"manufacturing" and "agriculture."  All workers are identical, and so would be willing to 
work wherever the wage is higher, be it in manufacturing or in agriculture. The labor 
market is assumed to be an integrated one in the sense that the same wage prevails in 
both sectors of the economy for a given type of worker -- a realistic enough stylization is 
some settings, particular for countries in East Asia. For a model in which workers are not 
identical, but where the marginal worker earns the same regardless of whether s/he works 
in one sector or the other, see Roy (1951). 
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 Let us start with a situation in which the demand for labor curve in the 
manufacturing sector, DM, is downward-sloping relative to origin OM, and likewise, the 
demand for labor curve in the agricultural sector, DA, is downward-sloping relative to 
origin OA.  The total labor supply is represented by the horizontal distance OM OA.   If 
the standard equilibrating forces in labor markets are free to operate, as is indeed the case 
in much of East Asia, wages would equalize across the two sectors at level W*.  At this 
wage, OM E workers would be demanded in the manufacturing sector, and OA E workers 
would be demanded in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the total labor demanded in 
the two sectors combined would exactly equal the total labor supplied in the economy. In 
such an equilibrium, the marginal worker is indifferent between working in the 
manufacturing sector or in the agricultural sector, because the two sectors pay the same 
wages. 
 Now suppose that economic growth takes place in the manufacturing sector.  
Because manufacturing firms need more workers to produce the extra output, the labor 
demand curve in the manufacturing sector shifts rightward to DM'.  Assuming no change 
in the agricultural product market, the agricultural employers' demand for labor curve 
would remain stationary at DA.  The labor market is now in disequilibrium, because at 
the original wage W*, more labor is demanded than is supplied.  To resolve this 
disequilibrium, some manufacturing employers raise wages in order to retain existing 
workers and attract new ones, and agricultural employers raise wages to prevent their 
workers from leaving. The result is that the labor market equilibrates at a new common 
wage W' > W*.  Because of the sector-specific shift in labor demand, more of the 
country's workers are now in the manufacturing sector than before (OM E' rather than  
OM E) and fewer in agriculture (OA E' rather than OA E).   
 In the integrated labor market model, economic growth in one sector benefits 
workers in all sectors. Three groups of workers have been identified in this analysis:  (i)  
Those who had been working in manufacturing and now earn higher wages than before;  
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(ii)  Those who are drawn by higher wages into manufacturing from agriculture; and (iii)  
Those who remain in agriculture and earn more than they did previously.  In this way, 
economic growth in a country's export sector reverberates throughout the labor market, 
benefiting those who produce manufactured goods and those who produce agricultural 
goods.   
 The extension of the integrated labor market model from two sectors to N sectors 
is immediate. 
 
B. Models with Wage Differentials and No Unemployment  
In contrast to the integrated labor market model just discussed, a number of 
segmented labor market models are characterized by wage differentials between 
segments. Models with wage differentials between segmented and no unemployment 
include the unlimited supply of labor model of Lewis (1954), the intersectoral shifts 
model of Kuznets (1955), the crowding model of Bergmann (1971), the minimum wage 
model with incomplete coverage of Welch (1974), and the modern sector enlargement 
model of Fields (1979b, 1980).  
These models maintain labor market dualism in the sense that real wages are 
higher in the formal sector than in the informal sector. In this sense, they differ from the 
integrated labor market model described in the last subsection, in which wages are the 
same in the different sectors. The segmented labor market models described in this 
section also maintain a particular kind of supply-side behavior: all workers not employed 
in the higher-wage formal sector are assumed to take up employment in the lower-wage 
informal sector. These models therefore exhibit no unemployment.  
Within this class of models, the most heralded version is the Nobel Prize-winning 
work of Lewis (1954). As discussed above, the distinguishing feature of the Lewis model 
was that the modern sector faces an unlimited supply of labor at wages only somewhat 
higher than subsistence levels. It is this that makes the Lewis model “classical,” in 
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contrast to a “neoclassical” model in which labor is scarce and has to be bid away from 
other uses. This feature of the classical model was later elaborated on by Ranis and Fei 
(1961), Fei and Ranis (1964), and Jorgenson (1967). 
The unlimited supply of labor to the modern sector is sometimes called an 
“infinitely elastic supply curve of labor,” but this designation is a misnomer. By 
definition, a supply curve tells the amount of a good or service that is forthcoming as a 
function of the relevant price. For it to be a proper function, there can be only one 
quantity for any price. That is, given the price of labor, the supply function delivers the 
unique quantity of labor available. Thus, in the Lewis model, when the formal sector 
wage is above the informal sector wage, the potential quantity of labor supplied to the 
formal sector is the entire labor force. However, because formal sector employers do not 
wish to employ all the workers who would like to work there at that wage, they (the 
employers) face an effectively unlimited supply of labor. Specifically, this means that no 
individual employer need raise the wage to attract additional labor, nor must employers 
as a whole within a substantial range. Indeed, there is a horizontal curve, but that curve is 
the wage as a function of employment, not the amount of labor supplied as a function of 
the wage. 
Over time, the process of savings, investment, capital formation, and economic 
growth highlighted in many growth models (both classical and neoclassical) shifts the 
demand for labor curve in the formal sector rightward. Workers respond to the increased 
demand for labor in the formal sector by taking up formal employment to the extent 
possible. Throughout a long range, the wage in the formal sector remains unchanged, 
because employers do not need to raise the wage to attract more labor. Ultimately, 
though, a turning point is reached once the supply of labor to the formal sector is no 
longer unlimited. 
Despite the many insights of the original Lewis model and Fei and Ranis’s 
amplification of it, I find one feature of the model troublesome: the nature of the wage in 
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the informal sector. Lewis used the term “subsistence wage.” If the wage is literally a 
subsistence wage, below which people cannot subsist, then it has a natural floor. But as 
these models have evolved, the informal sector wage does not take on the character of the 
minimum needed for survival. It is, rather, more of a basic wage, lower than the real 
wage received by formal sector workers. The question, then, is whether this wage is a 
constant low wage or whether it varies (inversely) with the number of people in the 
sector.  
The great majority of analysts regard production in the informal sector as subject 
to diminishing returns; see, for example, the Harberger quotation above. What 
diminishing returns in the informal sector implies is that when economic growth takes 
place and workers are drawn out of the informal sector into the formal sector, those who 
remain in the informal sector each receive a higher income than before; from my reading, 
this was first pointed out by Sen (1967). The informal sector wage should not remain 
constant. Indeed, the rising wage in the informal sector is a reason for the unlimited 
supply of labor to the formal sector to run out eventually: because the supply price of 
labor to the formal sector will have risen due to improved wage opportunities in the 
informal sector.  
In the dualistic labor market model with no unemployment, economic growth 
reduces poverty in two ways. One is the increase in wages and utility of those who are 
able to move from the informal to the formal sector. The other is the increase in wages of 
those who remain informal.  
Thus, we see that in these models with wage dualism and no unemployment, as in 
the other segmented labor market models, employment and wages in each sector of the 
economy are determined by labor market conditions in all sectors of the economy. Partial 
equilibrium analysis simply cannot explain what we see.  
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C. Models with Wage Differentials and Unemployment: The Harris-Todaro 
Model and Extensions of It 
In 1970, a major alternative was developed in the context of East Africa. John 
Harris and Michael Todaro (1970) formulated a model characterized by wage dualism 
and unemployment. Wage dualism arises in their model because employers in the formal 
sector are compelled by unions, minimum wage laws, or other institutional forces to pay 
higher-than-market-clearing wages, while the wage clears the informal sector labor 
market. The Harris-Todaro model also featured a spatial distinction: to be hired for a 
formal sector job, it was necessary for a worker to be physically present in the urban 
areas where the formal sector jobs are assumed to be located.  
In the Harris-Todaro model, more workers search for formal sector jobs than are 
hired. Employers hire some of the searchers but not all of them. Those not hired end up 
unemployed ex post. Open unemployment, though a feature of the world, was not a 
feature of the models reviewed in the last two subsections. 
 More specifically, the Harris-Todaro labor market operates as follows. Employers 
in the formal sector hire workers until the point where the marginal product of labor 
equals the institutionally-determined wage FW . On the other hand, in the informal 
sector, there is assumed to be free entry; thus, all persons who wish to work in the 
informal sector may do so. Each person employed in the informal sector earns a wage   
WI < FW . 
 Workers are assumed to consider the mathematical expected wages from each of 
two search strategies: (1) Searching for a formal sector job, which pays a relatively high 
wage but runs the risk of unemployment, and (2) Taking an informal sector job, which 
offers a low wage with no risk of unemployment. Harris and Todaro’s insight was that 
workers would be expected to allocate themselves between formal sector and informal 
sector search strategies so that the mathematical expected wages from the two search 
strategies are equalized: E(WF) = E(WI). Let EF denote employment in the formal sector 
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and LF the labor force in the formal sector. In the basic Harris-Todaro model, expected 
wage equalization leads to the following equilibrium condition: 
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E  i.e., the formal sector labor force 
exceeds formal sector employment, and therefore a Harris-Todaro equilibrium is 
characterized by open unemployment. 
Harris and Todaro’s fundamental contribution was to build a model with wage 
dualism and unemployment. The fact that the model remains part of our toolkit more than 
three decades later is a tribute to its basic insight and analytical power. 
At the same time, some of the assumptions of the Harris-Todaro model were 
judged to be too restrictive, and so the model was generalized in the years that followed 
to nest their specific formulation within a broader framework. Their model was first 
extended by Fields (1975), which allowed for on-the-job search from rural agriculture, 
the existence of an urban informal sector, preferential hiring of the better-educated, and 
employment fixity. The model has subsequently been extended and generalized to allow 
for duality within the rural sector, mobile capital, endogenous urban wage setting, risk-
aversion, a system of demand for goods, and many other factors (Corden and Findlay, 
1975; Calvo, 1978; Moene, 1988, 1992; Khan, 1989; Fields, 1989; Chakravarty and 
Dutta, 1990;  Bourguignon, 1990; Basu, 1997). 
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V. Contributions of these Models to Understanding and Policy Analysis 
Positive economic analysis is about “what is” and “what will be.” Normative 
economic analysis is about “what should be.” The remainder of this section demonstrates 
how the segmented labor market models presented above contribute to understanding (the 
concern of positive economics) and to policy analysis (the concern of normative 
economics). What all of the cases presented here have in common is that it is difficult if 
not impossible to make sense of them using single sector models only.  
 
A. Why an Increase in Productivity Might Cause Wages to Fall 
 The integrated labor market model maintains that the wage that any worker 
receives reflects supply and demand for labor in the labor market as a whole. 
Specifically, the wage is determined by what the last employer is willing to pay in order 
to attract and employ a worker and by what the last worker requires in order to be 
attracted and employed.  
One common misperception is that the wage “should” vary directly with labor 
“productivity”, commonly measured as value added per worker, in a given firm or sector. 
According to the integrated labor market model, nothing could be further from the truth. 
The following example illustrates why. 
Suppose that computers become available which enable half the formal sector 
workers to be replaced at lower cost while keeping total output constant. “Productivity,” 
measured by value added per worker, approximately doubles (“approximately,” because 
productivity would exactly double if the computers cost the same as the dismissed 
workers, more than double if the computers cost less). However, according to the 
integrated labor market model, formal sector wages will not double nor necessarily even 
increase. In fact, to the extent that wages change at all, they are likely to fall. Here is 
why.  
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The availability of computers that can replace workers induces a substitution 
effect, which would be expected to result in less labor being demanded to produce a 
given level of output. For this reason, labor demand would fall approximately in half. 
Unless the ability to produce at lower cost induces a corresponding increase in the scale 
of production, the demand for labor in the formal sector will be less after the productivity 
improvement than it was before.  
When the equilibrating forces in labor markets equalize wages across the various 
sectors, as the integrated labor market model maintains, a leftward shift of labor demand 
in one sector of the economy results in lower wages in all sectors of the economy. The 
reason that an increase in “productivity” does not result in higher wages is that employers 
do not need to pay wages as high as before to attract the desired number of workers. In 
this way, higher productivity can result in lower wages. 
The more general point of the integrated labor market model is that a worker’s 
wage is set not just by that worker’s own productivity nor by labor productivity just in 
that worker’s sector. Rather, wages are set by supply and demand for that category of 
labor in the labor market as a whole.  
 
 B. Why Taiwan’s Economic Growth Led First to Falling Unemployment at 
Constant Wages and then to Economy-Wide Wage Increases at Full Employment 
The Lewis model’s characterization of intersectoral linkages generated two major 
predictions. The first is that as long as there exists a surplus of labor to the formal sector, 
economic growth would generate intersectoral shifts of employment but little or no 
increase in real wages. The second prediction is that once the unlimited supply of labor to 
the formal sector is exhausted and the turning point is reached, subsequent economic 
growth is marked by rising real wages economy-wide. 
The model proved to be remarkably prescient. Take the case of Taiwan, where 
manufactured exports were the engine of growth. Data on unemployment and real wages 
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(monthly) are displayed in Figure 3. At the time Lewis was writing, the open 
unemployment rate was 6.3%, higher than the generally agreed-upon level of full 
employment. In the next six years of Taiwan’s economic growth, unemployment fell to 
4.3% and real wages in manufacturing rose by only 2% (total, not per year), consistent 
with excess labor continuing to be supplied relative to the amount demanded. But then, in 
the next decade (the 1960s), unemployment fell to 1.5% - a rate indicating severe labor 
shortages – and real wages shot up by 81%. Unemployment remained below 2% in the 
1970s and 1980s, then rose to 3% in the 1990s. At the same time, real wages doubled 
again in the 1970s and 1980s and rose by another 36% in the 1990s, not only in 
manufacturing but throughout the Taiwanese labor market.  
The two phases predicted by Lewis appear clearly in the data for Taiwan: falling 
unemployment at essentially constant wages, then rapidly rising real wages at full or 
over-full employment. The dualistic model with intersectoral linkages tells a compelling 
story, and it did it before it happened. 
 
C.  Why the Solution to Urban Unemployment in Kenya was not Urban 
Employment Creation but Rural Development 
The Harris-Todaro model was formulated in response to the emergence of serious 
unemployment in urban Kenya. The government of Kenya tried a policy of urban 
employment creation, which appeared not to have worked. Harris and Todaro’s model 
helped explain why. 
The model produced two powerful policy results. The first concerned a policy of 
formal sector employment creation to employ the unemployed (who, in the Harris-Todaro 
model, were all in urban areas, because that is where the formal sector jobs were assumed 
to be located). A policy of increasing formal sector employment by ∆EF= EF' - EF 
increases the formal sector labor force by 
I
F
F W
WEΔ and increases open unemployment by 
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creation.  
The second policy option considered was a policy of rural development. Suppose 
that such a program could increase the (rural) informal sector wage from IW  to '.IW  
From the H-T equilibrium condition, unemployment would then fall from  
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'
( −
I
F
F W
WE   Thus, in the Harris-Todaro model, the 
solution to urban unemployment is rural development.  
Soon after the model was published, the government of Kenya followed the 
Harris-Todaro precepts by putting into place an integrated rural development program. 
Indeed, unemployment in Kenya did indeed fall. For a more comprehensive welfare 
economic analysis of various policy options in the Harris-Todaro model, see Fields 
(2005). 
 
D.  Why Poverty Is So Severe in the Urban Informal Sector of Many 
Developing Countries 
Some of the worst poverty in developing countries is found in urban areas (United 
Nations, 2003). The extended Harris-Todaro model helps explain why this is so. 
One way in which the Harris-Todaro model has been extended is to have three 
employment sectors (formal employment, urban informal employment, and agricultural 
employment) in addition to unemployment. What is important in this particular extension 
is that the three sectors are located in distinct locations: formal employment and urban 
informal employment in the urban areas, agricultural employment in the rural areas. In 
this extension, there are three search strategies: (1) Search for a formal sector job full-
time while unemployed. (2) Give up on the search for a formal sector job and be 
employed in agriculture. (3) Search for a formal sector job part-time while informally 
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employed. (Note that search strategies (1) and (2) were those modeled by Harris and 
Todaro.)  
Presumably, those people located nearer to where the formal sector jobs are stand 
a better chance of being hired for any given job vacancy. The fact that they do has 
implications for urban informal wages.  
 For strictly positive numbers of people to choose each of the three search 
strategies, the extended Harris-Todaro equilibrium requires that expected wages equalize 
across the three search strategies. If one group of informal sector workers has better on-
the-job search opportunities than another, the labor market equilibrium must be one 
where the group with the better on-the-job search opportunities ends up with a lower 
wage in equilibrium.  
Viewed in this way, it is not surprising that some of the worst poverty in the 
developing world would be found in the urban areas: the urban poor consist at least in 
part of those who sought urban formal sector jobs but who were unlucky enough not to be 
hired for them. Of course, there is another reason for very low urban informal sector 
wages – lack of opportunities for wage employment and self-employment in rural areas – 
which the extended Harris-Todaro explanation complements. 
 
E.  Why Expanding Formal Sector Employment Sometimes Improves Labor 
Market Conditions and Sometimes Does Not 
The same policy can have different effects in the different models. Take the 
policy of expanding employment in the formal sector. 
In all three of the segmented labor market models, when more formal sector jobs 
are created, labor moves from the informal sector to the formal sector to take up the 
available jobs. Those individuals who are able to make the move are better off in all three 
models. 
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The models differ, however, in other respects. In the integrated labor market 
model, wages rise by equal amounts in the two sectors. All workers are better off by the 
same amount. 
In the model with wage dualism and no unemployment, the wage level in the 
formal sector stays the same, but wages rise to some degree in the informal sector. Thus, 
the remaining informal sector workers benefit from the expansion of employment  in the 
formal sector.  
Finally, in the Harris-Todaro model with wage dualism and unemployment, the 
informal sector wage may or may not rise. What will surely rise, though, is 
unemployment. In this model, unlike the other ones, formal sector employment creation 
produces both winners and losers.  
Thus, whether a policy of formal sector employment creation has favorable labor 
market effects depends on which labor market model best fits a particular country’s 
institutional circumstances.  
 
 
 
VI. A Final Word 
I shall now try to summarize the main points of this review and offer some brief 
concluding thoughts. 
First, differences between the various sectors’ labor markets appear pervasive. 
When possible, Occam’s razor suggests limiting the analysis to two sectors. But when 
two sectors are simply not enough, three-sector or n-sector models can and have proved 
insightful.  
Second, formal sector labor markets can be formulated in several alternative 
ways: in terms of market-clearing, in terms of institutional wage-setting, in terms of 
efficiency wages, and in terms of worker-side resistance to wage cuts.  
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Third, informal sector labor markets can be modeled as a free-entry sector, as a 
desirable sector, or as having its own internal duality.  
Fourth, the linkages between the different sectors can be modeled in a number of 
ways: as an integrated labor market, as a model of wage dualism and no unemployment, 
and as a model of wage dualism with unemployment.  
Fifth, a number of external events and policies can be understood only by using 
segmented labor market models. In these models, employment and wages in each sector 
of the economy are determined by labor market conditions in all sectors of the economy. 
Single-market analysis simply cannot explain what we see.  
The number of possible models combining these various components is 
enormous. Each of the three components – formal sector labor market, informal sector 
labor market, and intermarket linkages – has three or four alternatives. Even this 
relatively coarse categorization results in thirty-six different labor market models.  
No analyst would expect that the same model would fit East Africa and East Asia, 
South Africa and South Korea. Surely, the “correct” model is context-specific. Blending 
empirical observation and analytical modeling has yielded great advances. Coming up 
with the “correct” model matters for more than understanding; it matters for policy 
purposes as well. Sound labor market policies require sound labor market models.  
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Figure 1. 
The Standard Market-Clearing Labor Market Model. 
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Figure 2. 
The Integrated Labor Market Model:  
A Higher Demand for Labor in One Sector  
Raises Wages In all Sectors. 
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Figure 3. 
Unemployment and Average Real Wages in Taiwan. 
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